To me, the SolarWinds hack is remarkable because it (momentarily) managed to upend one kind of strategy with the other. A broader strategic calculus is palpable from the operational choices made in this intrusion — from the Concept of Operations which underpins it.
Continue reading “(Telemetry & toolchains) vs. tradecraft: The SolarWinds hack from a strategic lens”Deconstructing Ciaran Martin’s speech in 18 tweets
Ciaran Martin was the founder of the UK’s National Cyber Security Center and the former head of cyber operations at GCHQ. He gave a thought-provoking speech busting many myths around cyber power and cyber operations (text and video ).
I try to deconstruct it in 18 tweets. Click on the tweet to follow the thread:
1. Deconstructing @ciaranmartinoxf‘s speech from a cyber policy perspective in 18 tweets. Here, he alludes to the technical ambiguity which plagues policy work, i.e. reliance on effects-based frameworks. Operators only control effects to a certain degree for complex intrusions pic.twitter.com/HHUyIo07uI
— Pukhraj Singh (@RungRage) November 12, 2020
The chimera of cyber offence
This is a hot take on a recent piece by two National Law University Delhi academicians, Gunjan Chawla and Vagisha Srivastava: What are ‘offensive cyber capabilities’?
The article starts on the right note: briefly pointing out the evolution of terminology using which Western militaries have tried to circumscribe cyber operations within a quasi-legal framework.
Continue reading “The chimera of cyber offence”On China, it’s time to consider cyber operations – Hindustan Times
My opinion piece for Hindustan Times: https://www.hindustantimes.com/analysis/on-china-it-s-time-to-consider-cyber-operations/story-crMraUyDc64taDRHMhEnhP.html.
The recent border clashes between India and China have led analysts, habituated to conventional warfare, to compare the relative strengths of the two adversaries in terms of the number of tanks, aircraft and other military paraphernalia.
It appears that Indian strategic discourse has yet again discounted cyber operations as an instrument of power projection, which could have offered a degree of flexibility when it comes to coercing, compelling and imposing costs on the contentious neighbour. This is unfortunate considering how much Indian think-tanks have glamourised the cyber domain.
Continue reading “On China, it’s time to consider cyber operations – Hindustan Times”“In cyber, the generals should lead from behind” – College of Air Warfare
My talk at College of Air Warfare, Secunderabad, delivered on 17th Dec, 2019. Exquisitely titled, “In cyber, the generals should lead from behind.”

Lessons from Kudankulam – Part II: Targeting, jointness & offensive toolchains
I may (or may not) do a series of quick posts highlighting the strategic challenges encountered while investigating a cyberattack like Kudankulam. They would be filed under the ‘lessons-from-kudankulam‘ tag. Since our agencies were literally caught napping, this is a good primer for understanding what nation-state-level cyber capabilities entail:
Some dumbified excerpts from my dispatches to the government:
Continue reading “Lessons from Kudankulam – Part II: Targeting, jointness & offensive toolchains”A rejoinder to a rejoinder
Arindrajit Basu and Karan Saini wrote a detailed critique of my essay on cyber norms for the Modern War Institute: Setting International Norms of Cyber Conflict Is Hard, but That Doesn’t Mean We Should Stop Trying.
Here’s my rejoinder to their rejoinder:
Continue reading “A rejoinder to a rejoinder”