I may (or may not) do a series of quick posts highlighting the strategic challenges encountered while investigating a cyberattack like Kudankulam. They would be filed under the ‘lessons-from-kudankulam‘ tag. Since our agencies were literally caught napping, this is a good primer for understanding what nation-state-level cyber capabilities entail:Continue reading “Lessons from Kudankulam – I: Recreating the target context”
My second op-ed on the Kudankulam-ISRO hack for Outlook. The first piece for HT laid bare the challenges. This one proposes some parameters for cyber deterrence. Deterrence in cyberspace could be extremely bizarre and challenging: https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/opinion-a-post-kudankulam-roadmap-for-indias-cyber-deterrence/342174.Continue reading “A Post-Kudankulam Roadmap For India’s Cyber Deterrence – Outlook”
My op-ed in the Hindustan Times, originally titled, “An act of war in the Indian cyberspace.” My every word is measured: https://m.hindustantimes.com/analysis/what-the-cyber-attacks-on-kudankulam-and-isro-show-analysis/story-OVlR5MO18yk7jQFrnRvTpM_amp.html.
On September 3, I notified the National Cyber Security Coordinator about network intrusions into the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), after being tipped off by a third-party. It was right around the time of Chandrayaan-2’s final descent.Continue reading “An act of war in the Indian cyberspace – Hindustan Times”
In a guest post in relation to The Centre for Internet & Society’s recently held roundtable on “India’s cyber defense strategy,” Pukhraj Singh looks at the critical fissures – at the technical and policy levels – in global normative efforts to secure cyberspace. By charting out the key vectors and power asymmetries among key stakeholders – both leading state actors and private actors like Microsoft – Singh posits that there is much to be done before we circumscribe cyber operations within legal strictures: https://cis-india.org/internet-governance/blog/guest-post-before-cyber-norms-let2019s-talk-about-disanalogy-and-disintermediation.Continue reading “Before cyber norms, let’s talk about disanalogy and disintermediation – The Centre for Internet & Society”
I promised to walk someone through our Truth&Trust Online #TTOCon (thanks @TTOConference!) poster on “left-of-boom misinfosec” yesterday, but we missed the slot. I hate to disappoint, so here’s your online version…
— Sara-Jayne Terp is in the UK (@bodaceacat) October 6, 2019
Check out this thread by Sara-Jayne Terp of the Misinfosec Working Group.
Last year, Sara proposed the ingenious idea that, like cyber operations, cyber-enabled information operations (and disinformation) are also pivoted around the foundational triad of cybersecurity: confidentiality, integrity and availability (C-I-A).
I thought that was a phenomenal statement as it allowed us to define cyber-enabled information operations in machine-to-machine taxonomies and ontologies.Continue reading “Keep an eye out for the Misinfosec Working Group”
Arindrajit Basu and Karan Saini wrote a detailed critique of my essay on cyber norms for the Modern War Institute: Setting International Norms of Cyber Conflict Is Hard, but That Doesn’t Mean We Should Stop Trying.
Here’s my rejoinder to their rejoinder:Continue reading “A rejoinder to a rejoinder”
We may never know as to when did the cycle of escalation — which led to the eventual hack of the DNC — begin. It possibly had its origins in the Colour Revolutions, the tenure of the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or maybe even the release of the Panama Papers. The chain of causation certainly diverges from the narrative advertised by the mainstream media.Continue reading “Did the DNC become a countervalue target for cyber deterrence?”