Published by the Jindal Journal of International Affairs: http://jgu.edu.in/sites/default/files/section%204%20seventh%20file.pdf.
VOLUME 1, ISSUE 1, OCTOBER 2011
Battle-Ready for the Fifth Dimension:
Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence
This article provides a rare behind-the-scenes look at the cyber war and cyber defence
capabilities being developed by various great powers and situates India’s own developments
in this field within the larger context of emerging threats and modernisation of warfare.
The author ascribes the Stuxnet worm of 2010 to be a big eye opener which helped
place India’s cyber security systems on a war footing. He also depicts a future cyber
war scenario in which web-based weapons are integrated into conventional armouries
to achieve the perfect fifth dimension of warfare. The article also describes how experts
and analysts of strategic affairs who are outside the secretive government establishments
dealing with cyber war can contribute to meaningful reforms, institutions and changes
that can facilitate multilateral responses in the form of a global cyber security regime.
CHINA’S CYBER LEGIONS
Media reports have indicated that India’s National Security Council (NSC)
is mulling over a proposal on the institutionalisation of cyber-warfare, to
gain tactical and strategic superiority in the region by leveraging this potent
form of asymmetric conflict.1
Groundwork is being laid to address the
offensive aspects of Computer Network Operations, which would entail
infiltrating the information assets of hostile nations as well as non-state
actors. Such covert operations are devised to gain actionable intelligence
or cripple the command and communications infrastructure of the enemy.
The author is a cyber-warfare specialist employed with the National Technical Research Organisation,
Government of India. Prior to NTRO, he was associated with well-known cyber-intelligence firms across India,
Canada and the US. He has been a speaker at international security conferences and authored many technical
research papers. He can be reached at [email protected]
1 The Economic Times.Spy Game: India readies cyber army to hack into hostile nations’ computer systems.
The Economic Times. [Online] 06 August 2010. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-08-06/
© O.P. Jindal Global University Jindal Journal of Internationa
340 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
The National Technical Research Organisation (NTRO), a specialised
scientific facility under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO), and the Defence
Intelligence Agency (DIA), which represents the intelligence Wings of
the Tri-Services (Army, Navy and Air Force), would act as the primary
stakeholders, along with the peripheral involvement of Defence Research
and Development Organisation (DRDO). This seminal development is
the outcome of an unusual turn of events in India’s long-drawn effort to
address escalating incidents of cyber-espionage, a well-orchestrated and
systematic campaign of subversion and sabotage.
In July 2010, India’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) issued a press-note
acknowledging a report submitted by researchers from the Munk School of
Global Affairs, University of Toronto, on the “hacking of Indian Defence
Earlier in March 2009, the same group had released its first
report publicising the existence of GhostNet, a cyber-spying ring targeting
the offices of the Dalai Lama, embassies, foreign offices and ministries of
various countries including India.3
In a subsequent investigation spanning
many months, researchers from the Munk School and Shadowserver
Foundation, a volunteer group of cyber-crime investigators, laid bare
a second white paper divulging details of a newer, much complex and
clandestine variant of the snooping nexus, specifically aimed to target the
offices of the Indian Government.4
The origins of these attacks were traced to China, but no explicit evidence
was supplied to ascertain state involvement. In a carefully choreographed
move, the second paper was made public on a day when India’s External
Affairs Minister S.M. Krishna was scheduled to meet Chinese Prime
Minister Wen Jiabao on the former’s maiden visit to China. The incident
sparked media frenzy and had the potential to derail the bilateral agenda.5
The Canadian researchers were also able to access the attacker’s commandand-control
(C&C), tapping hundreds of classified documents being
purloined, thus adding further to the embarrassment.
2 Ministry of Defence, Government of India. Hacking of Security Information. Press Information Bureau.
[Online] 27 July 2010. http://pib.nic.in/release/rel_print_page1.asp?relid=63588.
3 Information Warfare Monitor, Citizen Lab, SecDev Group, Shadowserver Foundation.Shadows in the Cloud:
An investigation into cyber espionage 2.0. 2010.
4 Information Warfare Monitor, Citizen Lab, SecDev Group.Tracking GhostNet: Investigating a Cyber Espionage
5 The Hindu. India not to raise hacking with China . The Hindu. [Online] 06 April 2010. http://www.thehindu.
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 341
This diplomatic disaster of sorts was quelled in a peculiar fashion with
reassuring statements from various organisations mandated to guard the
nation’s cyber-frontiers. The underlying confidence in their approach
came from the fact that the Indian investigators had already homed
in on this nefarious web of intrigue. In fact, they were in the thick of
things by December 2009, when reports on Chinese attempts to hack
the Indian Prime Minister’s Office, the Office of the National Security
Advisor (NSA) and the Cabinet Secretariat surfaced.6
The timeline and the
modus operandi of this blitz had eerie similarities to the Chinese attacks
on Google’s infrastructure. At the peak of this debacle, the outgoing
NSA, M.K. Narayanan gave a rare interview on the incident and shared
some technical details – an unprecedented acknowledgement of India’s
seriousness on such matters.7
As in the case of GhostNet and its variants, attackers sent emails with
malicious PDF and Microsoft Office attachments which seemed to
originate from trusted senders like friends, family, colleagues or business
partners – a highly-targeted campaign using sophisticated exploitation
techniques and an improvisation of what is termed as Spear Phishing. This
was followed by media reports on a series of similar attempts targeting the
NSC, the National Security Advisory Board and a host of other sensitive
organisations. Clearly, hacking had come a long way from being the playful
antics of garage geeks to changing the course of diplomacy at the press
of a button.
Judging from the details available publicly, it is not difficult to estimate that
in all certainty, terabytes of information had been exfiltrated from various
government organisations including defence, security agencies, ministries,
scientific establishments, think tanks, academic institutions, media groups,
important individuals and the corporate sector. The scale of such an
operation and dimensions of this guerrilla war are simply mind-numbing.
One can imagine a nondescript safe-house with hundreds if not thousands
of geopolitical analysts, linguists, military experts and hackers busy in
processing and dispatching this data to various “consumers”, who are
probably scouting for potential moles, gauging the implications of a
regional development or war-gaming the readiness of India’s defence
6 India Today. Chinese hackers target PMO. India Today. [Online] 14 January 2010. http://indiatoday.intoday.
7 The Sunday Times. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6991789.ece. The Sunday
Times. [Online] 18 January 2010. http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article6991789.ece.
342 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
forces. The case of this being an independent enterprise should simply be
ruled out for once and ever – there has to be a tacit patronage from the
It also shows the amount of dedication and unflinching focus that is needed
to hone such a capability. This knowledge-driven domain literally exploits
the cutting-edge of technology and the mere fact that India is dubbed
as the ‘IT Superpower’ is therapeutic at best. China, whose information
warfare campaign has been much dissected and maligned, is just another
player in the game who has become too strong to reckon.
A ground-breaking report prepared by Northrop Grumman for the ‘USChina
Economic and Security Review Commission’ provides a clinical
insight into the history of Chinese cyber-warfare and its modest beginnings
ten years ago.8
An exhaustive, concerted, and multi-faceted doctrine of
the Peoples’ Liberation Army (PLA)on the “informationalisation” of the
military has helped it achieve this envious and coveted goal. Between the
years 2000 and 2006, hoards of Chinese students attended information
security courses at American universities and returned to their homeland
ditching lucrative job offers. It was attributed that these state-sponsored
students became the backbone of China’s cyber-army.
THE RUSSIAN CONNECTION
While acknowledging the hyper-nationalistic motives driving Chinese
hackers, one must not forget the tantalising economics of cyber-crime
which make the job of law-enforcement and counter-intelligence even
harder. Commercial cyber-intelligence teams at Symantec and iDefense
have discovered the emerging trend of transnational mercenary hacking
groups selling stolen information to the highest bidders. This is a
multi-million dollars arms bazaar, where national or ideological affiliations
do not matter and a Brazilian or Moroccan hacker can be found trading
with an Iranian.
Another related development which tipped the scale towards China is its
will to act as a safe-haven for cyber-crime infrastructure. Around 2006, a
powerful syndicate of cyber-criminals based in St. Petersburg, called the
8 Northrop Grumman. Capability of the People’s Republic of China to Conduct Cyber Warfare and Computer Network
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 343
Russian Business Network (RBN), monopolised the identity theft, child
pornography, phishing, spam, and malware industry by providing hackproof
At the peak of its existence, it had estimated revenues of around $150
million and flaunted connections with Russians politicians. Only after
a vociferous campaign by media and international security agencies did
the Russian authorities decide to dismantle RBN. In a few days after the
crackdown, it had found a new home in China, though only temporarily.
This incident became a precursor for the growth of an ancillary industry
in China, the bullet proof hosting services, catering to a wide-array of
shady clients including espionage operators. Its after-effects are being
seen globally now. In a country like China where the Internet is so strictly
regulated, this brashness and audacity of non-state actors leaves little to
THE AMERICAN RESPONSE
Such policies, which border on twisting the rules for strategic leverage, can
act as a double-edged sword. It can be gauged from the fact that in 2008,
the US Department of Defense had to neutralise an extremist website
being operated as a honey pot by the C.I.A. and Saudi intelligence to track
terror activities, as the forum was being used to plan attacks on US forces
in Iraq.10 Despite the C.I.A.’s objections, the website was taken down in a
joint-operation by the Pentagon, the Justice Department and the National
Security Agency, leaving Saudi princes fuming at the loss of a critical
The incident triggered an internal debate on the lack of a clear mandate,
guidelines and operating procedures for such operations, prompting the
former C.I.A. Director Michael V. Hayden to comment in a state of
plausible deniability, “Cyber was moving so fast that we were always in
danger of building up precedent before we built up policy”. It comes as
no surprise that many top officials of the American establishment are
being accused of hyping the cyber-war threats to push forth their narrow
9 Wikipedia. Russian Business Network. Wikipedia. [Online] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russian_Business_
10 The Washington Post. Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web site illustrates need for clearer cyberwar
policies. The Washington Post. [Online] 19 March 2010. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/
344 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
INDIA’S CYBER PREPAREDNESS
To guarantee and retain information superiority, appropriate defensive
measures and countermeasures are a must. While the debate on the exact
definition of critical information infrastructure (CII) rallies on, the IT
(Amendment) Bill 2008 attributes the designation of a national nodal
agency for the protection of CII and the Indian Computer Emergency
Response Team (CERT-In) to undertake incidence response under
the Sections 70A and 70B, respectively.11 MoD also mandates Defence
Information Assurance and Research Agency (DIARA) as the nodal cyber
security agency for the Tri-Services.12 However, substantive resolution is
needed on the role imparted to the National Informatics Centre (NIC),
the IT infrastructure services organisation managing a majority of the
government websites. A government-wide information security and
regulatory compliance policy, dealing with issues like electronic document
classification, compartmentalisation and centralised security clearance, is
also the need the hour.
Any attempt to arrive at a possible solution to the aforementioned issues
from a geopolitical, strategic affairs and policy making perspective will need
a holistic approach taking into account the technical, legal and international
complexities. India’s National Security Advisor, Shiv Shankar Menon, has
proposed the ratification of a global cyber-security regime or a cyber-arms
control treaty.13 Similar endeavours of international regulation in domains
like chemical, nuclear and space warfare have been impactful. The primary
stakeholders are even receptive to the idea of re-engineering the underlying
communication protocols of the Internet to reach a level of moderation.
While most nations, including those engaged in questionable activities over
this medium sounded amenable, the talks have broken down repeatedly.
In this scenario, the responsibility of honing the discourse lands on the
shoulders of able policy makers, strategic affairs analysts and geopolitical
experts who can go to the depths of the problem and evangelise to the
international security community with a fervent zeal. However, there
exists a great chasm between the technical security professionals and high11
The Information Technology (Amendment) Bill, 2008. [Online] 2008. http://www.cyberlaws.net/
12 The Economic Times. Hostile agencies trying to steal defence secrets from India. The Economic Times.
[Online] 07 September 2010. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-09-07/news/27605145_1_
13. Proceedings of the Munich Security Conference 2011. Cyberspace Presents Complex Global Challenges.
[Online] 2011. http://www.securityconference.de/Program.425+M578c0183589.0.html?&L=1.
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 345
level interlocutors. The special interest groups on information warfare
and cyber-security lack the contribution of technologists with hands-on
exposure, thus succumbing to misdirection and confusion. It is imperative
that we inculcate in the thought process of contemporary policy makers
the multifaceted views of such professionals.
The question that looms large is whether we can reach a coherent and
agreeable consensus on attribution, deterrence and pre-emption of cyberattacks.
While India has made tall strides in order to assert its place in the
fifth dimension of war, more awareness and seamless initiative is needed.
Mere wishful thinking of being the next cyber-power would not take India
too far. One must always keep in mind that hacking has its origins as a
counter cultural movement preaching fierce individualism, full disclosure
and an emphasis on breaking things. The very act of institutionalisation is
an antithesis to a domain which breeds on chaos and anarchy.
HOW STUXNET CHANGED EVERYTHING
As one picks through the trail of debris left by the Stuxnet worm in India,
the turn of geopolitical events behind this watershed incident do not
cease to spark the imagination. Enough has been said about the sheer
technical brilliance and the blatant shortcomings of this attack believed
internationally to be aimed primarily at Iran’s nuclear programme. But
one could go a bit further and try to hypothesise the strategic and tactical
underpinnings of this attack. For the sake of argument, blaming it all on
Israel is something that we usually do, but there is more to learn from
I will continue from where Robert Baer left. The former C.I.A field officer
and operative par-excellence wrote an article in March 2010 assessing the
potential fallouts of the Mahmoud al-Mabhouh operation.14 Mabhouh, a
senior Hamas operative, was found dead in a Dubai hotel on January 19th,
2010, assassinated by a Mossad hit-squad. The brazenness and temerity
with which this operation was executed left many nations fuming. With
Dubai leading the acerbic opposition, any hopes to forge an Arab Sunni
lobby or availing the Gulf airspace for a missile attack on Iranian nuclear
installations were quashed. But the ‘Plan B’ was already in progress. Stuxnet
began spreading in January of that year too. The chain of command must
14 Baer, Robert. Did the Dubai Assassination Really Help Israel? . Time Magazine. [Online] 09 March 2010.
346 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
have explored all the options. Little did Baer know that the world had
changed a lot since Osirak.
A few years ago, when the cyber war rhetoric had picked pace, this domain
finally found its place in the ‘conflict spectrum’ – somewhere between
‘petty crimes’ and ‘organised cartels’. Stuxnet pushed it up by a few notches
on an axis which terminated at ‘nuclear attack’!
Little known is the fact that with this single incident, the discourse on
critical information infrastructure (CII) protection in India was turned on
its head. For long, the government had shied away from putting the onus
of this gargantuan and intricate effort on the designated authorities. In the
bureaucratic muddle that comes with a domain as complex and cuttingedge
as cyber security, a lot was lost in translation. The first and foremost
problem to be reckoned with was developing a consensus on what the
definition of CII implies and how far should India’s cyber-preparedness
strategy be stretched in order to safeguard the assets not directly under the
control of the government. Stuxnet resolved all this and much more.
As the incidence response teams found that a majority of the hosts
compromised by the Stuxnet attack were from India, a strenuous effort
was undertaken to assess its motive and origins. However, this investigation
actually resulted in the eye-opening revelation that India’s industrial
control systems are susceptible like that of any other nation. It was indeed
a matter of grave concern that the only known and documented attempt
to compromise SCADA (supervisory control and data acquisition) systems
at a widespread scale had a substantial impact on India, including the
organisations manning the utilities like power, hydroelectric and gas, etc.15
Apart from debunking all theories of conventional wisdom and security
through obscurity on cyber security which were a rage in the corridors of
power, the Stuxnet attack also provided an impetus to initiate the procedure
for an effective and implementable CII protection policy. People knew
what was at stake now, far better than living in a state of denial. It set many
benchmarks and precedents which are surely to have a positive role in
furthering the health and vitality of India’s digital economy.
The insertion of section 70A in the amended IT Act makes sure that CII
protection has constitutional validity and priority. As premier national
15 Carr, Jeffery. Did The Stuxnet Worm Kill India’s INSAT-4B Satellite? Firewall, The Forbes Blog. [Online]
29 September 2010. http://blogs.forbes.com/firewall/2010/09/29/did-the-stuxnet-worm-kill-indias-insat-4bsatellite/;
The Economic Times. Stuxnet worm making its way into India quietly. The Economic Times. [Online]
23 December 2010. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2010-12-23/news/27580939_1_computerworm-stuxnet-virus.
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 347
security policy and advocacy groups like the National Security Council
are refining the mandate for the protection of India’s cyber-frontiers, the
onus of upholding the security of the nation’s vital information assets will
certainly gain more focus and priority. It is not a matter of surprise that
in March 2011, a media report indicated that a joint team comprising of
officials from NTRO and Air Traffic Control services were undertaking
a vulnerability assessment exercise to ascertain the resiliency of airport
networks against attacks like Stuxnet.16 The article also stated,
“…As a counter measure, the top brass of the country, which includes
all chiefs of staff and secretaries of home, telecom, defence, finance and
IT, has drafted a plan to thwart any such attack”.
While it is indeed a major leap forward, such a surgical exercise can
overshadow the broader debate on how these problems are to be tackled
at a national or even an international level. What really falls under the
purview of CII? How willing is the private sector to invest and contribute?
Are the public-private partnerships acting as mere sounding-boards for
such ideas? Are the laws and executive directives providing enough clarity?
Is the absence, clash or disparity of mandates leading to a bureaucratic
logjam or tussle while handling such incidents?
Consider the case of a national-level botnet mitigation strategy, which
could possibly become the precursor to an Internet kill-switch mechanism
in case of a coordinated attack against the country. It is a known fact that
most cyber-espion age rings and worms like Stuxnet have a multi-pronged
command-and-control which communicates and relays information to the
perpetrators. There are ways in which they can be neutralised or rendered
partially dysfunctional by carefully tweaking the backbone routing
DNS and BGP sink holing are concepts which have garnered a lot of
interest among the law-enforcement and intelligence agencies alike. Not
only can the botnets be dismantled with the execution of a few commands,
but it could also provide counterintelligence or counteroffensive inputs
which may lead to definitive attribution – the most challenging piece of the
puzzle in case of a state-sponsored cyber-attack.
May 2011 marked the visit of US Secretary of Homeland Security Janet
Napolitano to initiate the US-India Homeland Security Dialogue. Home
Minister P. Chidambaram represented the Indian side and the Dialogue
16 The Economic Times. Stuxnet attack fear pushes govt to check IT network. The Economic Times. [Online]
31 March 2011. http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2011-03-31/news/29365994_1_scada-atcssystems.
348 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
paved the way for a landmark agreement on cyber-security, in times of its
increasing relevance in fighting the war against terror, and CII protection.17
The corresponding computer emergency response teams from both
the countries, US-CERT and CERT-In, would be the primary point of
contacts in this bilateral knowledge-sharing exercise. Secretary Napolitano
“…to choke off the life line of some of these terrorist organizations,
to open a dialogue that includes cyber security which is necessary to
protect the networks that are critical infrastructure”.
Not only does it symbolise the start of a new era in fostering a global
cyber-security regime but may also prove monumental in dismantling
international cyber-crime syndicates which also harbour terrorists, drug
smugglers, human traffickers and espionage rings.
UNIFIED COMMAND: A VISION OF CYBER WAR IN THE FUTURE
The nerve centre of the Unified Cyber Command (CYBERCOM) is
brimming with activity. The top echelons of military and intelligence
have gathered in the Situation Room, staring at the massive projection
screens which display half a dozen key-indicators, getting a minute-byminute
assessment of the emerging crisis. A team of operatives and
analysts from Red Team, an elite squad of hackers specialising in offensive
tactics, are manning their positions on the operations floor. An unending
stream of information is being fed into the Intelligence Fusion Platform,
special software running on a grid of supercomputers, supplying real time
decision-analytics to the mission directors. Petabytes of structured and
unstructured data generated by intelligence analysts and purloined from
compromised systems are being processed at lightning speeds – patterns
are drawn, anomalies are highlighted and hitherto unknown connections
are established. This piece of analytical wizardry, leveraging the cuttingedge
of data mining, artificial intelligence and human-computer interaction,
acts as the brain of CYBERCOM.
A hostile act of an enemy nation has put India’s national security in
jeopardy. Decision makers give the go-ahead to launch a military offensive
and the armed forces are brought in a state of operational readiness. A
massive, multi-faceted cyber-attack will precede the conventional one, thus
providing the crucial element of surprise.
17 US Department of Homeland Security. Readout of Secretary Napolitano’s Trip to New Delhi. US Department
of Homeland Security. [Online] 27 May 2011. http://www.dhs.gov/ynews/releases/pr_1306521907450.shtm.
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 349
A systematic campaign of cyber-espionage undertaken in the last few years,
targeting the adversary’s key establishments and functionaries, has already
given the much-needed tactical and strategic impetus. Virtual spies have
accessed the minds of its people, penetrated the labyrinths of its critical
infrastructure and sabotaged the industrial foundations. A voyeuristic
Brigadier with a penchant for beautiful women, who liked storing his
intimate encounters on a personal computer, was blackmailed by the
HUMINT division into becoming an asset. The source-code repository of
a telecommunications company, which manufactures the majority of that
nation’s network devices, was stealthily modified to allow the provision of
a remotely activated kill-switch.
Some of these backdoor routers made theirway to MILNET, the operational
network of the adversary’s armed forces. Classified information from
combat outposts, live video streams from unmanned aerial vehicles and
the sweeps of air-defence radars – everything flows through MILNET.
The terabytes of information being exfiltrated also aided a covert war
of economic subversion and spreading misinformation. Dozens of such
executions highlighted the effectiveness of this asymmetric domain.
As the situation crosses the Rubicon, CYBERCOM authorises a sequence
of hostile actions that collectively form the first strike of battle. Information
flow is altered, blind-spots are created and a communications blackout is
perpetrated. Critical infrastructure like power plants, gas pipelines, water
distribution and electricity grids are administered using SCADA industrial
control systems, allowing the operators to monitor and manage them
Although the system generally undergoes rigorous security testing and
is operated on a network using proprietary communication protocols,
this methodology of ensuring security through obscurity is as good as
its weakest link. A callous operator or a mismanaged network can allow
loopholes to arise– exactly the kind of opportunities that Red Team
keeps scouting. The compromised computer of an employee working at
the electricity grid, which powers the adversary’s capital, gave away the
VPN login credentials to the SCADA interface. The deployed system was
manufactured by a multinational vendor and had already been reverseengineered
by the Red Team. A handful of vulnerabilities were discovered
in it and added to the zero-day exploit stockpile, to be used for situations
similar to this. The grid is taken-over and an artificial power-surge cripples
the capital of the adversary.
350 Jindal Journal of International Affairs / Vol. 1
A group of patriotic black hat hackers, clandestinely funded and patronised
by CYBERCOM, had created a strain of undetectable malware which
infected hundreds of thousands of computers worldwide, forming the
part of a massive botnet. The group is given instructions to undertake
a denial of service (DoS) attack on crucial targets like the banks, stock
market, government websites and ISPs. This bot-army chokes the
designated networks with an electronic flood of packets, literally bringing
the adversary’s economy and information infrastructure to a grinding halt.
A series of follow-up attacks on the BGP (Border Gateway Protocol)
routers and DNS (Domain Name Service) servers pulverises the last
remnants of the adversary’s Internet backbone, or whatever is left of it.
The first phase of the conventional attack begins as the ground troops
start marching. The Air Force scrambles a formation of fighters to mount
an attack. As they enter the hostile airspace, the fifth-generation stealth
aircraft leading the air-formation emanates a long-range data beam from an
electronically scanned array (AESA) emitter. This special aircraft is fitted
with an ultra-secret next-generation jammer, an electronic warfare system
that can deliver cyber-attacks through the free space into an aperture. The
data beams are packed with specialised waveforms and invasive algorithms
that work like keys to open networks and jam electronic equipment. The
aircraft also emits a bit-stream meant to be the secret activation code which
toggles the kill-switch for a brand of network routers backdoored by Red
This death-ray completely disrupts MILNET, leaving the opponent’s
military in a state of panic and chaos. The element of surprise provided
by the CYBERCOM makes sure that the enemy’s command-and-control is
neutralised, paving the way for a swift and decisive victory.
The above-narrated semi-fictional tale is inspired from an assimilation of
actual incidents and global developments relating to cyber-warfare. In May
2010, the US appointed a four-star general, Keith Alexander, as the head
of its Cyber Command.18 A month later, another four-star general was
dethroned for his jaded sense of humour. The Rolling Stones article that
did it for him also mentions how General Stanley McChrystal would seek
18 US National Security Agency. Biography – Commander, US Cyber Command, .US National Security Agency.
2011 / Assessing India’s Cyber-Defence Preparedness 351
the help of “cyber freaks” – “24-year-old kid with a nose ring, with some
******* brilliant degree from MIT, sitting in the corner with 16 computer
monitors humming” – to aid his counter-insurgency plan.19
A little-known company called Palantir Technologies has become a rage in
the American intelligence community due its ground-breaking intelligence
fusion platform, which is changing the way the CIA looks at each shred of
information.20 There are numerous incidents of hackers running wild over
power grids and other critical infrastructure. Then in June 2010, the first
instance of a malware specifically targeting installed SCADA software was
discovered (W32.Stuxnet). And if there’s still any doubt on the veracity of
an airborne cyber-jammer, a handful of defence contractors have already
developed Next-Generation Jammer with invasive Suter programs to be
deployed on the futuristic F-35 fighters.21
As countries like the US, China, Israel and India gear up for cyber war,
how effectively the conventional forces and intelligence agencies tap its
full potential is just waiting to be seen.
19 Rolling Stone. The Runaway General. The Rolling Stone. [Online] 22 June 2010. http://www.rollingstone.
20 Palantir Technologies. The industry solution for cyber. Palantir Technologies. [Online] http://www.palantirtech.
21 Aviation Week. Navy Confirms That New Jammer Will Be Cyber-Invasion Device. Aviation Week. [Online] 1
July 2011. http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/blogs/defense/index.jsp?plckController=Blog&plckScript=blog