My second op-ed on the Kudankulam-ISRO hack for Outlook. The first piece for HT laid bare the challenges. This one proposes some parameters for cyber deterrence. Deterrence in cyberspace could be extremely bizarre and challenging: https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/opinion-a-post-kudankulam-roadmap-for-indias-cyber-deterrence/342174.Continue reading “A Post-Kudankulam Roadmap For India’s Cyber Deterrence – Outlook”
My op-ed in the Hindustan Times, originally titled, “An act of war in the Indian cyberspace.” My every word is measured: https://m.hindustantimes.com/analysis/what-the-cyber-attacks-on-kudankulam-and-isro-show-analysis/story-OVlR5MO18yk7jQFrnRvTpM_amp.html.
On September 3, I notified the National Cyber Security Coordinator about network intrusions into the Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant (KKNPP) and Indian Space Research Organisation (ISRO), after being tipped off by a third-party. It was right around the time of Chandrayaan-2’s final descent.Continue reading “An act of war in the Indian cyberspace – Hindustan Times”
I promised to walk someone through our Truth&Trust Online #TTOCon (thanks @TTOConference!) poster on “left-of-boom misinfosec” yesterday, but we missed the slot. I hate to disappoint, so here’s your online version…
— Sara-Jayne Terp is in the UK (@bodaceacat) October 6, 2019
Check out this thread by Sara-Jayne Terp of the Misinfosec Working Group.
Last year, Sara proposed the ingenious idea that, like cyber operations, cyber-enabled information operations (and disinformation) are also pivoted around the foundational triad of cybersecurity: confidentiality, integrity and availability (C-I-A).
I thought that was a phenomenal statement as it allowed us to define cyber-enabled information operations in machine-to-machine taxonomies and ontologies.Continue reading “Keep an eye out for the Misinfosec Working Group”
Arindrajit Basu and Karan Saini wrote a detailed critique of my essay on cyber norms for the Modern War Institute: Setting International Norms of Cyber Conflict Is Hard, but That Doesn’t Mean We Should Stop Trying.
Here’s my rejoinder to their rejoinder:Continue reading “A rejoinder to a rejoinder”
We may never know as to when did the cycle of escalation — which led to the eventual hack of the DNC — begin. It possibly had its origins in the Colour Revolutions, the tenure of the then-Secretary of State Hillary Clinton or maybe even the release of the Panama Papers. The chain of causation certainly diverges from the narrative advertised by the mainstream media.Continue reading “Did the DNC become a countervalue target for cyber deterrence?”
My essay for the Modern War Institute, US Military Academy at West Point: https://mwi.usma.edu/death-knell-international-norms-cyber-conflict/.
On July 8, Michael Schmitt, a law professor and former judge advocate in the US Air Force, posted a perplexing tweet about changing his mind on the “status of cyber capabilities as ‘weapons.’” He followed it up with the link to a recent paper he coauthored for the International Law Studies journal of the US Naval War College.Continue reading “A Death Knell for the International Norms of Cyber Conflict – Modern War Institute, US Military Academy”
During my stint with the government, we established formal contact with a Western signals intelligence agency. In one of the highly ceremonial and limited interactions with our counterparts from that agency, my boss joked of recruiting a “young gun” who was spearheading cyber operations. That was me.
While I have always rated myself as a below-average hacker, I was indeed a test case for the government in inducting ‘specialists’ into the system via lateral entry (Don’t ask me how it went).Continue reading “A case for the assassination of military hackers”